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REPLY BRIEF
Come now the Appellants (hereinafter "Defendants") by and
through counsel Thomas J. Scribner of fisher', Rcnbner., Moo 1; &
Stir land, l1,, L ,

r

arid reply to Appellee's (hereinafter "Plaintiff")

Brief of the Appellee.
PACTS
Defendants adopt and incorporate herein by reference the
Statement of Facts set forth in their Brief of the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD THE
ISSUES BEFORE IT AND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
N.iin! iff I'luii'ilil Mill a-iittnst I u • 1 f 'inl.tni • * 'i Defendants'

alleged violation of an insurance agreement.

Plaintiff's first

summary judgment motion was denied.

Subsequently, Plaintiff

filed

udgmen

it" SPPOIIII mot inn tot -;ui .

appeal , which was based entirely -

•••» subject oi; this

)efendants' alleged violation

of another insurance agreement (the "Agreement")—an aqnvemcMit,
1

which was neither pled by nor referenced in Plaintiff's
complaint.

(R. at 5.)

In fact, Plaintiff's second motion for

summary judgment was Plaintiff's first assertion or reference of
an kind that Defendants were allegedly liable for breach of the
Agreement.

The trial court's summary judgment decision granted

judgment to Plaintiff on an agreement upon which Plaintiff had
not sought relief in its Complaint and which was improperly
before the trial court.
A.

Plaintiff's failure to plead the Agreement in its
Complaint prevented Defendants from asserting the
legitimate Statute of Limitations defense.

Defendants' first notice that Plaintiff sought recovery on
the Agreement was when Plaintiff filed its second motion for
summary judgment on December 11, 1991. (R. at 382.)

The

Agreement was cancelled by Plaintiff and effective February 6,
1985. (R. at 255.)

Plaintiff's second motion for summary

judgment was brought after expiration of the Statute of
Limitations for contract actions set forth in UCA 78-12-23.
Because Defendants' liability on the Agreement was not pled in
Plaintiff's complaint and Defendants had no notice of Plaintiff's
cause of action, Defendants never had the opportunity to raise
the Statute of Limitations defense in the lower court.
The Statute of Limitations defense is an affirmative defense
set forth in Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
is affirmatively pled in an answer. (See URCP Rule 12 (h), Staker
v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983),
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984).)
Defendants could not assert the Statute of Limitations defense it
2

their answer because Plaintiff's had not sought relief on the
Agreement in Plaintiff's complaint.
Although Rule 12 allows certain affirmative defenses to be
raised by motion, the Statute of Limitations defense is not one
of them.

URCP Rule 12 (b) and (h). Therefore, Defendants had no

vehicle by which to plead the Statute of Limitations defense—it
could not be raised by motion and Plaintiff's complaint did not
include the Agreement as a cause of action.
Plaintiff attempts to argue that "notice pleading," as set
forth in Rule 8 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, somehow
permits Plaintiff to obtain summary judgment relief under the
Agreement—which had not been not pled by Plaintiff and which was
not before the trial court.

(See Brief of Appellee P. 10.)

Accepting Plaintiff's argument denies Defendants substantial
rights and legitimate defenses and allows Plaintiff to file its
complaint based on one agreement and obtain summary judgment on
an entirely different agreement simply by asserting that
Defendants somehow should have had notice that Plaintiff would
seek relief based upon Defendants' alleged breach of an agreement
which was not pled in the Complaint.
If Plaintiff believed that it had a valid claim based on the
Agreement, Plaintiff should have amended it complaint to assert
the related cause of action—not raise it for the first time in a
motion for summary judgment.

An amended complaint would then

appropriately allow Defendants to assert their defenses,
including the defense that Plaintiff's cause of action on the
3

Agreement was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Significantly, "notice pleading" cannot be used to
legitimize claims which were not claimed in Plaintiff's
complaint.

(See Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962).)

In Ellis the court addressed a claim that of a breach of a title
insurance policy.

With respect to that claim the court stated:

"The policy is not contained in the record before us, and the
particular provision or provisions claimed to have been breached
are not set out in the complaint.

The claim does not meet the

requirements of our rules and was properly dismissed."

(Ellis,

at 385-386, emphasis added.)
The situation in the case at bar is similar, except that the
trial court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's unpled claim.
When Defendants attempted to point this problem out to the trial
court, Defendants' arguments were ignored.

(R. at 514-519.)

In National Farmers Union Prop, and Cas. Co. v. Thompson,
286 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme Court Stated:
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must not
lose sight of the cardinal principle that under our
system of justice, if an issue is to be tried and a
party's rights concluded with respect thereto, he must
have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it.
Emphasis added.

Notice pleading cannot legitimize a claim that

the Defendants have not had any opportunity to meet.
B.

The record requires that Plaintiff's summary judgment
be reversed.

Plaintiff's complaint clearly pleads a cause of action for
premiums earned from December 27, 1984 to April 30, 1985. The
4

complaint refers to a policy that was cancelled due to nonpayment of premiums.

(R. at 5.)

Defendants received a notice of

cancellation dated January 22, 1985 indicating that their policy
was cancelled because they were not eligible and advising them to
obtain coverage elsewhere.

Interestingly, although Plaintiff's

cancellation notice to Defendants contains a space where either a
refund or deficiency is to be noted, none was noted.

(R at 255.)

The first time Plaintiff claims that it is due additional
premiums from Defendants under the Agreement discussed above is
in Plaintiff's second motion summary judgment filed by Plaintiff
over six years later.

(R at 382.)

The record cannot support

summary judgment on a claim that was never pled by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that it "undercharged" Defendants and that
the rates Plaintiff had to charge for the sixty nine days
coverage which were provided to Plaintiff prior to the
cancellation notice were set by state law and could not be
varied.

Plaintiff's argument absurdly places the responsibility

on Defendants to ensure that Plaintiff's rates are correct and
ignores both the principles of agency law as set forth in
Defendants' appellate brief, (Brief of Appellant pgs. 13-17) and
the stated purposes of the Insurance Code, Utah Code Annotated
section 31-18-1(2): "The purposes of this chapter are:

a. To

protect policy holders and the public against the adverse effects
of excessive, inadequate and discriminatory rates; . . . ."
Plaintiff's argument, which effectively raises unilaterally the
estimated and quoted rates to Defendants by over 60%, violates
5

such purposes.
Further, the trial court's judgment evidences the court's
misunderstanding and that it based its decision on Plaintiff's
first motion for summary judgment and not Plaintiff's second
motion—the only motion before the trial court.

The trial court

found that subsequent to the notice of cancellation Defendants
were notified by Plaintiff that they were not eligible for
preferred rates but that they could be insured under a higher
rate by an affiliate company and that a policy was later issued
by that affiliate company. (R. at 512.)
The court's language directly paraphrases language contained
in a letter from Plaintiff to Defendants which was part of
Plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment but which was not
part of Plaintiff's second motion.

However, the court's finding

is contradicted by the notice of cancellation, (R. at 255),
which was received over a month before the letter paraphrased by
the Court in its ruling.

(R. at 255, 256.)

The letter referred

and paraphrased by the Court dealt with an insurance policy which
was not the subject of Plaintiff's second motion for summary
judgment.

This is further demonstrated by the fact that the

amount awarded in the court's ruling (prior to the judgment
prepared by Plaintiff and upon which Plaintiff's judgment was to
be based) mirrored the complaint rather than Plaintiff's second
motion for summary judgment.
It is easy to understand how the Court could make this
error.

The Court assumed it was ruling on a cause of action
6

which had been pled in Plaintiff's complaint, rather than on a
cause of action raised for the first time by Plaintiff in its
second motion for summary judgment.
C

The trial court's summary judgment awarded Plaintiff an
amount different than that Plaintiff requested in its
motion—evidencing the court's misunderstanding.

Plaintiff argues correctly in its brief that the trial court
has the authority to correct clerical errors in judgments
pursuant to Rule 60 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, Rule 60 (a) assumes that the error is clerical and not a
misunderstanding of what is before the court.
After the trial court issued its first ruling on Plaintiff's
second motion for suitanary judgment, Defendants submitted a motion
for new trial arguing that the amount of the award was wrong—the
amount awarded corresponded to the amount Plaintiff had sought in
its first motion for summary judgment and was in significant
excess of what Plaintiff's had requested in their second motion
for summary judgment.

(R. at 516, 517.)

Although, Plaintiff

stated in its response that the error could be corrected, the
trial court's response was to ignore both sides and caused the
incorrect judgment to be entered. (R. at 527, 541.)
Plaintiff then submitted a proposed judgment reflecting what
Plaintiff had sought for in its second motion for summary
judgment and not what the trial court had awarded.

(R. at 542.)

Defendants objected since the judgment did not correspond with
the trial court's ruling. (R. at 551-553.)

The Court then

entered summary judgment against Defendants for the amount set
7

forth in Plaintiff's proposed judgment which judgment was
significantly different the trial court's ruling.

(R. at 546.)

Although the court issued a brief memorandum, it did not
reconcile the differences in the language and award between its
preliminary ruling and the judgment prepared by Plaintiff, nor
did the court address Defendants' claims that Plaintiff's
judgment was granted on a matter which was not before the court
and which had not been pled by Plaintiff.

(R. at 556.)

The fact that the trial court reviewed this matter three
times without addressing any of the parties' concerns
demonstrates that the court did not understand the issues which
were before it.

The court further failed to reconcile the

differences between the amount of the judgment it signed and the
court's preliminary ruling despite numerous opportunities to do
so.
II.

THE ESTIMATED RATES QUOTED TO DEFENDANTS# PAID BY
DEFENDANTS# AND SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S PREMATIC FINANCING
AGREEMENT ARE BINDING ON THE PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff argues that the rates for insurance set forth in

the Prematic Financing Agreement which Plaintiff quoted to
Defendants and which were paid by Defendants should somehow be
ignored.

(Brief of Appellee p. 21.)

Rather, Plaintiff urges the

Court to adopt statutory rates calculated over six years later.
Plaintiff claims that the estimate is somehow not binding on i t —
violating both the principles of agency law and the terms of the
Prematic agreement.
3 Am. Jur.2d Agency section 273 (1986) states that w[i]f an
8

act done by an agent is within the apparent scope of authority
with which he has been clothed, it does not matter that it is
directly contrary to the

instructions of the principal.

principal will, nevertheless, be liable. . . . "

The

Plaintiff's

agent calculated the annual premium and did not notify the
Defendants of any changes within 30 days as required by the
Prematic application and agreement.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should ignore the final
clause of the Prematic agreement which states: "If rejection of
application is not received by customer within 30 days after
date, acceptance is presumed."

(R. at 248.)

However, Plaintiff

argues that the applicable rates should be rates calculated some
six years later rather than the rates of the Prematic agreement.
Plaintiff's argument is nonsensical since some 60 days into the
period for which Defendants were attempting to obtain insurance,
Plaintiff notified Defendants that their insurance was cancelled.
Further, the notice was void of any request for additional
premiums.

(R. at 255.)

Yet, while Plaintiff asks the Court to ignore the rates
paragraphs of the Prematic agreement, Plaintiff does request the
Court to enforce paragraph 4 of the same agreement which
authorizes changes in the monthly payment: "in the event of
changes of coverage or rates ordered by either the customer or
the insurance company."
is misplaced.

Plaintiff's reliance on this provision

Plaintiff cannot argue that this provision permits

Plaintiff to charge Defendants a rate higher than set forth in
9

the Prematic agreement because Plaintiff does not argue that a
"change of coverage or rates," or required by the Prematic
agreement, ever occurred between November 30, 1984 and February
6, 1985.
Plaintiff's argument is that its agent miscalculated the
rate and that it was actually higher to begin with.

To argue

otherwise would require that the Court ignore the fact that this
was a new application.

There had been no prior premiums from

which an adjustment could be made.

This clause in the agreement

was intended to provide flexibility over the course of the
contractual relationship of the parties.

It was not intended to

allow Plaintiff to adjust the estimates of its agents by any
amount it wishes.
In light of the fact that the case at bar does not involve a
"change of coverage or rates#" Plaintiff's claim that Allston
Finance Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co.. 463 N.E. 2d 562 (Mass. App.
1984) supports its position is mistaken.

Allston, would only

apply if there were a change in the charges by the insurance
carrier.

An error by an agent is very different from a change in

rates.
III. THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS OP PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR $367.21 WAS
PRESERVED BELOW AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Defendants, in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for New
Trial and Request for Oral Argument, raise the propriety of
Plaintiff's claim for $367.21. Defendants' memorandum states in
relevant part:
It is important to remember that plaintiff did not
10

bring a cause of action based on the first insurance
application; rather, plaintiff's cause of action began
based on the second insurance application, which the
Olcotts neither signed nor had any knowledge of.
Despite the fact that plaintiff did not sue on the
first insurance application (in fact, plaintiff has
never asked the Olcotts to pay the $367.39 plaintiff
claims is due under the first application), it filed a
motion for summary judgment based on that application.
(R. at 514-519.)
Defendants' appellate memorandum provided the only
opportunity Defendants have had to contest the propriety and
timeliness of Plaintiff's summary judgment claim which Plaintiff
has never pled.

As set forth above, there was never an

opportunity to address the timeliness of Plaintiff's summary
judgment claim based on the Statute of Limitations because that
defense must be asserted affirmatively in an answer.

Defendants

were denied the opportunity to answer and defend against
Plaintiff's claim alleged in its second motion for summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment granted by the trial court should be
reversed and remanded because it deals with issues which were not
properly pled, and were therefore never before the court, as well
as because genuine issues of material fact exist.
Dated this 3rd Day of November, 1993,

THPMA J.
T^pMAS
^ttor
:torney /f
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